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I. Reductionist and Structuralist Accounts of Causality  
 
Economists have intermittently concerned themselves with causality at least since David 
Hume in the 18
th century.  Hume is the touchstone for all subsequent philosophical 
analyses of causality.  He is frequently regarded as a causal skeptic; yet, as an economist, 
he put a high priority on causal knowledge.
1  In “On Interest” (Hume 1754, p. 304), one 
of his justly famous economic essays, he writes:   
it is of consequence to know the principle whence any phenomenon arises, and to 
distinguish between a cause and a concomitant effect . . . nothing can be of more 
use than to improve, by practice, the method of reasoning on these subjects . . . 
 
The utility of causal knowledge in economics is captured in Hume’s conception of what it 
is to be a cause:  “we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, . . . where, 
if the first had not been, the second never had existed” (Hume 1777, p. 62).  Causal 
knowledge lays the groundwork for counterfactual analyses that underwrite economic 
and political policy judgments. 
  At least two questions remain open:  first, what exactly are causes “in the objects” 
(Hume 1739. p. 165)?  second, how can we infer them from experience?  Hume answers 
the first question by observing that the idea of cause comprises spatial contiguity of cause 
to effect, temporal precedence of cause over effect, and necessary connection between 
cause and effect.  Necessary connection “is of much greater importance” then the other 
two elements (Hume 1739, p. 77).  Necessary connection is the basis for practical 
counterfactual analysis.   
  Hume answers the second question by pointing out that contiguity and temporal 
precedence are given in experience, but that no experience corresponds to the notion of 
                                                 
1 See Hoover (2001, ch. 1) for a fuller discussion of Hume’s views on causality as a philosophical and 
economic problem. 
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necessary connection.  Since Hume famously believed that all knowledge is either logical 
and mathematical or empirical, the failure to find an a priori or an empirical provenance 
for the idea of necessary connection provides the basis for the view that Hume is a causal 
skeptic.   
  According to Hume, the closest that we can come to an empirical provenance for 
the idea of necessary connection is the habit of mind that develops when two objects or 
events are constantly conjoined.  Unfortunately, constant conjunction is too weak a reed 
to support a satisfactory account of the connection between causal knowledge and 
counterfactual analysis – however practically important Hume deemed the latter. 
  After Hume, the dominant strategy in the analysis of causality has been reductive.  
Its objects are, first, to define causes in terms of something less mysterious with the 
object of eliminating causality as a basic ontological category and, second, to provide a 
purely empirically grounded mode of causal inference.  An important modern example is 
found in Patrick Suppes (1970) probabilistic theory of causality.  For Suppes, A prima 
facie causes B, if the probability of B conditional on A is higher than the unconditional 
probability of B (P(B|A) > P(B)).  The type of empirical evidence that warrants calling 
one thing the cause of another becomes, in this approach, the meaning of cause:  the 
ontological collapses to the inferential.   
  Such approaches are not successful.  As Suppes and others realized, the concept 
of cause must be elaborated in order to capture ordinary understandings of its meaning.  
For example, cause is asymmetrical:  if A causes B, B does not (in general) cause A.  It is  
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easy to prove that if A is a prima facie cause of B, then B is a prima facie cause of A.
2  
Asymmetry can be restored by the Humean device of requiring causes to occur before 
their effects:  P(Bt+1|At) > P(Bt+1) does not imply P(At+1|Bt) > P(At+1). 
  Another standard counterexample to prima facie cause as an adequate rendering 
of cause simpliciter is found in the correlation between a falling barometer and the onset 
of a storm.  Although these fulfill the conditions for prima facie cause, we are loath to 
say that the barometer causes the storm.  The standard device for avoiding this conclusion 
is to say the barometer will not be regarded as a cause of the storm if some other variable 
– say, falling air pressure – screens off the correlation between the putative cause and 
effect.  The probability of a storm conditional on a falling barometer and falling air 
pressure is the same as the probability of a storm conditional on falling air pressure alone.  
The falling barometer does not raise the probability of the storm once we know the air 
pressure.  Such a screening variable is known either as a common cause (as in this 
example in which the falling air pressure causes both the falling barometer and the storm) 
or as an intermediate cause (when the variable is a more direct cause that stands between 
the effect and a less direct cause in a chain). 
  These are only two examples of the various additional conditions that have to be 
added to bring the simple notion of prima facie cause into line with our ordinary notions 
of causation.  Such strategies suggest, however, that the reductive notion is haunted by 
the ghost of a more fundamental concept of causality and that we will not be satisfied 
until the reductive notion recapitulates this more fundamental notion.   
                                                 
2 See Hoover (2001, p. 15).  The joint probability of A and B can be factored two ways into a conditional 
and a marginal distribution:  P(B, A) = P(B|A)P(A) = P(A|B)P(B).  If A is a prima facie cause of B, then 
P(B|A) > P(B).  Substituting for P(B) in the joint probability distribution gives us P(B|A)P(A) < 
P(A|B)P(B|A) or P(A|B) > P(A) – that is, B is a prima facie cause of A. 
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  Recognition of the specter of necessary connection suggests another possibility:   
simply give the reductive strategy up as a bad job and to embrace causality as a primitive 
category, admitting that no satisfactory reduction is possible.  Such an approach once 
again distinguishes the ontology of causality from the conditions of causal inference that 
had been conflated in reductivist accounts.  Such a non-reductive strategy implies that we 
can never step outside of the causal circle:  to learn about particular causes requires some 
prior knowledge of other causes.  Nancy Cartwright (1989, ch. 2) expresses this 
dependence in a slogan:  “no causes in; no causes out.”  It is also the basis for James 
Woodward’s (2003) “manipulability” account of causality (cf. Holland 1986).  Roughly, 
a relationship is causal if an intervention on A can be used to alter B.  The notion of a 
manipulation or an intervention may appear to be, but is not in fact, an anthropomorphic 
one, since it can be defined in terms of independent variations that may arise with or 
without human agency.  Nor is the circularity implicit in this approach vicious.  What is 
needed is that some causal relationship (say, C causes A) permits manipulation of A, 
while what is demonstrated is the existence of a causal relationship between A and B – 
what is proved is not what is assumed. 
  Causal knowledge in a manipulability account is the knowledge of the structure of 
counterfactual dependence among variables – for example, how a clock works or how it 
will react to various interventions.  Whereas in reductive accounts of causality, the 
connection between the structure of causes and counterfactual analysis was too weak to 
be satisfactory, here it is basic.  Woodward’s account is closely allied with the analyses 
of Pearl (2000) and Hoover (2001).  I prefer the term structural account to manipulability 
account, since manipulations are used to infer structures and structures are manipulated.  
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Still, that preference is merely a matter of terminology – the underlying causal ontology 
is the same in all three accounts. 
 A  structural account seems particularly suited to economics.  Economics is 
distinguished from other social sciences in its dedication to a core theory that is shared, to 
one degree or another, by most economists.  The core theory can be seen as articulating 
economic mechanisms or structures not unlike physical mechanisms that provide the 
classic illustrations of causal structure.  While the very notion of an economic structure 
seems to favor the manipulability or structural account of causality, with its 
fundamentally causal ontology, the same tensions already evident in Hume’s account of 
causality are recapitulated through the history of economics.  These tensions are reflected 
in two problems:  the inferential problem (how do we isolate causes or identify 
structure?) and counterfactual problem (how do we use a knowledge of causal structure 
to reason to unobserved outcomes?).  
  John Stuart Mill, one of a distinguished line of philosopher/economists, 
contributed answers to both questions.  In his System of Logic (1851), he describes 
various canons for inferring causes from empirical data.  But in his Principles of Political 
Economy (1848) he denies that economic structures can be inferred from these or other 
inductive rules.  For Mill, economics involves many considerations and many 
confounding causes, as well as human agency.  While there may be some coarse 
regularities, it is implausible that any economic laws or any strict causal relationships 
could be inferred from data.  But economics is not, therefore, hopeless as a counterfactual 
science.  Rather it is “an inexact and separate science” (Hausman 1992).  Economics is 
the science of wealth in which the choices of human actors, known to us by direct 
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acquaintance, interact with the production possibilities given by nature and social 
organization.  From our a priori understanding, we can deduce axiomatically the effects 
of causes in cases in which there are no interfering factors.  When we compare our 
deductions to the data, however, we do not expect a perfect fit, because there are in fact 
interfering factors and our deductions must be thought of as, at best, tendencies.  There is 
no simple mapping between the deductions of theory and any sort of empirical test or 
measurement.  Implicitly at least, Mill’s view has been highly influential in economics.  
Yet it gives rise to a perennial conundrum:  if we know the true theory, we can dispense 
with empirical study; but how do we know that the theory is true? 
  I shall use the tension between the epistemological, inferential problem and the 
ontological, counterfactual problem as a background against which to situate four 
approaches to causality in economics.  These four approaches are different, yet 
overlapping and sometimes complementary.  The goal will not be to ask, which is right?  
Rather, what is right about each?  They are 1) the notion of causal order implicit in the 
Cowles Commission (Koopmanns 1950; Hood and Koopmanns 1953) analysis of 
structural estimation, revived in, for example, Heckman (2000); 2) Granger-causality 
(Granger 1969, 1980; Sims 1972); 3) the structural account of causality that appeals to 
invariance under intervention as an inferential tool (Hoover 2001); and 4) the graph-
theoretic approaches associated with Judea Pearl (2000) and Glymour, Spirtes, and 
Scheines (2000).   
  Both economic theory and econometrics have become sciences expressed in 
models.  My approach will be to discuss causality in relationship to the mapping between 
theoretical and econometric models.  This mapping is related in a complex way to the 
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distinction between the inferential and the counterfactual problems.  To keep things 
concrete, I will use macroeconomic models to illustrate the key points. 
 
II.  Structual Estimation and Causality 
Trygve Haavelmo’s monograph “The Probability Approach in Econometrics” (1944) 
marks a watershed in the history of empirical economics.  Appropriately defined, 
econometrics is an old discipline, going back perhaps to William Petty and the tradition 
of “political arithmetic.”  Some of the characteristic tools of econometrics are traceable to 
William Stanley Jevons if not to earlier economists (see Morgan 1990).  Yet, until 
Haavelmo there was considerable doubt whether classical statistics had any relevance for 
econometrics at all.  Haavelmo’s great innovation was to suggest how economic 
tendencies could be extracted from nonexperimental economic data – that is, to suggest 
how to do what Mill thought could not be done.  The true interpretation of Haavelmo’s 
monograph is highly disputed (see Spanos 1995).  On one interpretation, economic theory 
permits us to place enough structure on an empirical problem that the errors can be 
thought to conform to a probability model analyzable by standard statistical tools.  On 
another interpretation (associated with the “LSE (London School of Economics) 
approach” in econometrics), analysis is possible only if the econometric model can 
deliver errors that in fact conform to standard probability models and the key issue is 
finding a structure that ensures such conformity (Mizon 1995). 
  The Cowles Commission took the first approach.  The problem, as they saw it, 
was how to identify and measure the strength of the true causal linkages between 
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variables.  To do this, one started with theory.  Suppose, to take a textbook example, that 
theory told us that money (m) depended on GDP (y) and GDP on money as 
 
(1)     m = αy + εm 
 
(2)     y = βm + εy, 
 
where the variables should be thought of as the logarithms of the natural variables and εm 
and εy are error terms that indicate those factors that are irregular and cannot be 
explained.  Following Haavelmo, the Cowles Commission program argues that if a model 
is structural then these error terms will follow a definite probability distribution and can 
be analyzed using standard statistical tools.  Furthermore, if the structural model is 
complete, then the error terms will be independent of (and uncorrelated with) each other. 
  If we have a model like equations (1) and (2), including knowledge of α and β 
and of the statistical properties of εm and εy, then answering counterfactual questions 
(probabilistically) would be easy.  The problem in the Cowles Commission view is that 
we do not know the values of the parameters or the properties of the errors.  The real 
problem is the inferential one:  given data on y and m, can we infer the unknown values?  
As the problem is set out, the answer is clearly, “no.”   
  The technique of multivariate regression, which chooses the coefficients of an 
equation in such a manner as to minimize the variance of the residual errors, implicitly 
places a directional arrow running from the right-hand to the left-hand side of an 
equation.  The error terms are themselves estimated, not observed, and are chosen to be 
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orthogonal to the left-hand side regressors – the implicit causes.  Although if we knew the 
direction of causation, a regression run in that direction would quantify the relationship, 
we cannot use the regression itself to determine that direction.  Any regression run in one 
direction can be reversed, and the coefficient estimates are just different normalizations 
of the correlations among the variables – here of the single correlation between m and y.
3  
We have no reason to prefer one normalization over another.   
  Of course, if we knew the values of εm and εy, it would be easy to distinguish 
equation (1) from equation (2).  But this is just what we do not know.  Our best guesses 
of the values of εm and εy are determined by our estimates of α and β, and not the other 
way round. 
  The problem is made easier if equations (1) and (2) are influenced by other, and 
different, observable factors.  Suppose the theoretical model is  
 
(3)     m = αy + δr + εm 
 
(4)     y = βm + γp + εy, 
 
where r is the interest rate and p is the price level.  Relative to the two-equation structure 
y and m are endogenous and r and p are exogenous variables.  The values of the 
parameters can be inferred from regressions of the endogenous variables on the 
                                                 
3 If ρ is the correlation between y and m, then the regression estimate of α is  2 2 ˆ y m σ σ ρ α =  and the 
estimate of β is  2 2 ˆ
m y σ σ ρ β = , where ρ is the correlation coefficient between y and m,   is the estimated 
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exogenous variables.  First, eliminate the endogenous variables by substituting each 
equation into the other and simplifying to yield: 
 












































Next estimate regressions of the form 
 
(5)     m = Π1p+ Π2r + Εm 
 
(6)     y = Γ1p + Γ2r + Εy, 
 
where Π1, Π2, Γ1 and Γ2 are estimated coefficients and Εm and Εy are regression residuals.  
Such a regression is known as a reduced form because it expresses the endogenous 
variables as functions of the exogenous variables and errors only. 
  The estimated coefficients of (5) and (6) can be matched with the coefficients on 

























2 .  Given this identification of the estimated coefficients with the 
theoretical coefficients, the parameters are easily recovered.  A little calculation shows 
  10Hoover, “Economic Theory and Causal Inference” 









Γ = β , 




Γ Π − Γ Π
Γ Π
= δ , and 
1 1 2 2
2
2 2
Γ Π − Γ Π
Γ Π
= γ .  It is only the 
assumption that we know the theoretical structure of (3’) and (4’) that allows us to 
recover these parameter estimates.  In the argot of econometrics, we have achieved 
identification through “exclusion restrictions”:  theory tells us that p is excluded as a 
cause of m and that r is excluded as a cause of y.   
  It is easy to see why we need factors that are included in one equation and 
excluded from another simply by looking at the formulae that define the mapping 
between the theoretical and estimated coefficients.  For example, if r did not appear in 
(3’), we could interpret δ as equal to zero, so that (3’) would collapse to (3).  Then Π2 and 
Γ1 would both equal zero, and β (the causal strength of m on y in (4’), the other equation) 
would not be defined. 
  The Cowles Commission approach privileges economic theory in manner that is 
strikingly anti-empirical.  We can use the strategy to measure a causal strength, such as β, 
only on the assumption that we have the form of the structure correct as in (3’) and (4’).  
Not only is that assumption untested, it is untestable.  Only if the theory implies more 
restrictions than the minimum needed to recover the structural parameters – that is, only 
if it implies “over-identifying restrictions” – is a statistical test possible.  What is more, 
the Neyman-Pearson statistical testing strategy adopted by Haavelmo and the Cowles 
Commission has been interpreted as implying one-shot tests, in which the theoretical 
implication to be tested must be designated in advance (see Spanos 1995).  Mutual 
adaptation between the empirical tests and the theory that generated the testable 
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implications invalidates the statistical model.
4  While there is some possibility of 
adapting the Neyman-Pearson procedures to account for specification search, only the 
simplest cases can be analyzed.  Mutual adaptation is certainly practiced, but it lacks a 
sound foundation given the statistical approach generally adopted in economics. 
  Herbert Simon (1953) clarified how identified structural models could be 
interpreted causally.  If we know that the parameters α, β, δ, and γ are mutually 
independent – that is, the values taken by one places no restrictions on the range of values 
open to the others – we can place the arrows of causation in a system like (3) and (4), say, 
as 
 
(3’’)     m ⇐ αy + δr + εm 
 
(4’’)     y ⇐ βm + γp + εy, 
 
where the symbol “⇐” is interpreted as a directional equality.  In this case, m and y are 
mutual causes.  If α were zero under all circumstances – that is, if y were omitted from 
equation (4’’), then m would cause y, but y would not cause m.  Such systems with a one-
way causal order are called recursive. 
  Simon pointed out an inferential problem closely related to the identification 
problem.  To keep things simple, consider a recursive system without error terms: 
                                                 
4 In the simplest cases, this is obvious.  If one adopts a rule of trying different regressors until one finds one 
that passes a t-test at a 5 percent critical value, then the probability of finding a “significant” relationship 
when the null hypothesis of no relationship is in fact true is much greater than one in twenty.  For more 
complicated search procedures, the effect of search on the true size of statistical tests is hard to work out 
analytically.  In can be shown, however, that some search procedures impose a large cost to search, while 
others impose quite small costs (Hoover and Perez 1999, 2004). 
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(7)     m = δr,  
 
(8)     y = βm + γp. 
 
In this system, if β, δ, and γ are mutually independent parameters, m causes y.  But can 
we infer the causal structure from data alone?  Unfortunately not.  Adding (7) and (8) 
yields 
 















While substituting (7) into (8) yields 
 
(8’)     y = γp + βδr. 
 
Every solution to (7) and (8) is also a solution to (7’) and (8’), yet in the first system m 
appears to cause y, and in the second system y appears to cause m.  One might say, “yes, 
but the second system is clearly derived from the first.”  But this is not so clear.  If we 
replace the second system with 
 
(7’’)      r p y m µ λ φ + + = , 
 
(8’’)      y = θp + ρr, 
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then what appear to be coefficients that are functions of more basic parameters in (7’) and 
(8’) can be treated as themselves basic parameters.  Taking an appropriate linear 
transformation of (7’’) and (8’’) will convert it to a system with a causal order like that of 
(7) and (8) in which the coefficients are functions of its parameters.  The same set of 
values for m, y, r, and p are consistent with this new system as with the three previous 
systems.  The data alone do not seem to prefer one causal order over another.  This is the 
problem of observational equivalence. 
  If we had some assurance that we knew which coefficients were true parameters 
and which were functions of more basic parameters, or even if we knew for certain which 
exogenous variables could be excluded from which equations, then we could recover the 
causal order.   
  At this point, the theoretical causal analyst is apt to turn to the economist and say, 
“we rely on you to supply the requisite subject matter knowledge.”  Surprisingly, 
economists have often been willing to oblige on the basis of a priori theory or detailed 
knowledge of the economy.  But we are entitled to ask:  “Where did such detailed 
knowledge come from?  How was the theory validated?  Was the validation done in a 
way that did not merely assume that the problem of observational equivalence had been 
solved at some earlier stage?  And, if it were soluble, at the earlier stage, why is it a 
problem now?” 
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III. The Assault on Macroeconometric Models 
  The epistemic problem of inferring causal strengths threatens to undermine the 
counterfactual uses of causal structure.  Macroeconometric models are wanted in large 
part to conduct policy analysis.  Without knowledge of the parameter values true policy 
analysis – that is, working out the effects of previously unobserved policy – is not 
possible (see Marschak 1953).  Despite the fact that the Cowles Commission program 
had clearly articulated the central difficulties in inferring causal structure, macromodeling 
in the 1950s and 1960s was undaunted.  I believe that the main reason for ignoring the 
vast epistemic problems of structural modeling can be traced to the confidence in our 
direct, nonempirical acquaintance with true economic theory that many economists 
shared with (or inherited from) Mill.  The Cowles Commission program pointed to the 
need for a priori theory.  Yet, this was not a problem, because what most distinguished 
economics from all other social sciences was, as Cartwright (1989, p. 14) later put it, 
“economics is a discipline with a theory.” 
  But was it well enough articulated?  The structural econometric models of Jan 
Tinbergen, starting in the 1930s, through Lawrence Klein in the 1950s were models of 
macroeconomic aggregate data reflecting commonsensical assumptions about their 
interrelationships.  Deep economic theory typically referred to the decision problems of 
individual agents – it was microeconomic.  Even Keynes’s General Theory (1936), the 
bible of macroeconomics, had referred to individual behavior as a basis for aggregate 
relationships, such as the consumption function or the money-demand function.  In his 
early review of the General Theory, Leontief (1936) called for grounding these 
relationships in a general-equilibrium framework in which the interactions of all agents 
  15Hoover, “Economic Theory and Causal Inference” 
16 September 2005 
had to be mutually consistent.  Klein (1947) himself called for deriving each 
macroeconomic relationship from the optimization problems of individual economic 
actors.  Together these quests formed the program of microfoundations for 
macroeconomics. 
  Klein’s leg of the microfoundational program developed more rapidly than 
Leontief’s.  It was soon discovered that because decision-making is oriented toward the 
future, expectations are important.  This was particularly clear in the investment literature 
of the late 1950s and early 1960s and led to a flowering of theoretical studies of 
expectation formation associated with the Carnegie Institute (now Carnegie-Mellon 
University).  Because expectations must be grounded in past information and because the 
economic effects are slow to unfold, the current values of variables depend on past 
values.  In other words, the quest for microfoundations underscored the dynamical 
character of economic relationships, reviving lines of inquiry that had begun in the 
interwar period.  
  The Leontief leg of the microfoundational program finally took off around 1970.  
Robert Lucas, in a series of papers that launched the new classical macroeconomics, 
insisted that models should respect the constraints of general equilibrium.
5  Lucas made 
two key assumptions.  Up to this point, most economists had thought that macroeconomic 
phenomena arose in part because one market or other failed to clear.  Modeling non-
clearing markets is theoretically difficult.  Lucas’s first assumption is that markets in fact 
(at least to a first approximation) clear.  His second assumption is that expectations are 
formed according to Muth’s (1961) rational expectations hypothesis.  The rational 
expectations hypothesis assumed that what economic actors expect is, up to a random 
                                                 
5 See Hoover (1988, 1992a, b). 
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error, what the economic model predicts.  Rational expectations are appealing to 
economists because they do not imply an informational advantage on the part of the 
modeler.  If models could actually outpredict economic actors, then there would be easy 
profit opportunities for the modeler.  But the modelers are themselves economic actors 
(and inform other economic actors) who would themselves take advantage of the profit 
opportunities with the effect of changing prices in such a way that the opportunity 
disappeared (the process referred to as arbitrage).  In effect, acting on non-rational 
expectations would help to make the economy conform to rational expectations. 
  Lucas’s assumptions had strong implications for monetary policy as well.  In a 
world in which markets clear, under conditions that many economists regard as 
reasonable, increases in the stock of money raise prices but do not change real quantities:  
there is pure inflation.  In such a world, only an expectational error would allow a 
monetary-policy action to have a real (as opposed to a purely inflationary) effect.  If 
people have rational expectations, then monetary policy actions can induce such errors at 
best randomly.  Systematic monetary policy cannot, therefore, have real effects on the 
economy.  This is the policy-ineffectiveness proposition, which was the most startling 
result of the early new classical macroeconomics (Sargent and Wallace 1976). 
  We can see how Lucas’s analysis relates to causality and the Cowles Commission 
program through a simple structural model (again the variables should be interpreted as 
the logarithms of natural variables): 
 
  (9)            yt = α(pt –  ) + εyt, 
e
t p
(10)           pt = mt – yt, 
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(11)         mt = γ1mt-1 + γ2yt-1 + εmt, 




The variables are the same as those defined earlier, except that now the dynamic 
relationships are indicated by time subscripts.  Equation (9) says that prices affect real 
GDP only if they differ from expectations formed a period earlier.  Equation (10) shows 
that the level of prices is determined by the size of the money stock relative to real GDP.  
Equation (11) is the monetary-policy rule:  the central bank sets the money supply in 
response to last period’s levels of money and real GDP.  Finally, (12) says that expected 
prices are formed according to the rational expectations hypothesis – i.e., they are the 
mathematical expectation of actual prices based on all the information available up to 
time t – 1.  The information set (Ωt-1) includes the structure of the model and the values 
of all variables and parameters known at t – 1, but does not include the values of the 
current error terms. 
  The model is easily solved for an expression governing GDP, 
 
(13)    




















1 ,  
 
as well as one governing money that merely recapitulates the earlier equation  
 
(11)     mt = γ1mt-1 + γ2yt-1 + εmt. 
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  The system (11) and (13) is identified.  In some sense, it shows mutual causality:  
m causes y, and y causes m.  Yet, if we restrict ourselves to current (time t) values, then 
contemporaneously mt causes yt. 
  The coefficients in (13) are functions of the parameters of the model (9)-(12) 
because of the way expectations are formed:  economic actors are seen as accounting for 
the structure of the model itself in forming expectations.  Lucas (1976) criticized 
macromodelers for failing to incorporate expectations formation of this sort into their 
models.  In his view, despite the claim that they were “structural,” previous 
macromodelers had estimated forms such as 
 
(14)      yt t t t t y m m y Ε + Π + Π + Π = − − 1 3 1 2 1 ,  
 
(15)     mt = Γ1mt + Γ2 mt-1 + Γ3yt-1 + Emt, 
 
with enough exclusion restrictions to claim identification.  He argued that these estimates 
were not grounded in theory – at least not in a theory that took dynamics, general 
equilibrium, and rational expectations seriously.  In effect, Lucas argued that the 
coefficients in (14) and (15) were not casual, structural parameters but coefficients that 
were functions of deeper parameters.  Mapping these coefficients onto those in (11) and 






















3 , Γ1 = 0, Γ2 = γ1, and  Γ3 = γ2.   
 Notice  that  Γ2  and  Γ3 just recapitulate the parameters of the policy function (11).  
In contrast Π1, Π2, and Π3 are coefficients that shift with any change in one of the policy 
parameters.  Equation (14) may have appeared to the macromodeler to be a structural 
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relationship, but if Lucas’s theory is correct it would not be invariant to policy 
manipulation, as Haavelmo and the Cowles Commission had insisted that a causal 
relationship should be.  This is the policy noninvariance proposition or Lucas critique.   
  While the Lucas critique is a celebrated contribution to macroeconomic analysis, 
in this context it is secondary.  It might be interpreted as little threat to the Cowles 
Commission program.  Instead of identifying structure through exclusion restrictions, 
Lucas seems to show us that a more complicated, nonlinear identification is needed.  The 
demands on a priori theoretical knowledge are higher, but they are of the same kind.  
Once the parameters are identified and estimated, counterfactual analysis can proceed 
using (11) and (13).  In fact, the combination of the idea that only unexpected prices can 
have real effects (encapsulated in the “surprise-only” aggregate-supply function (9)) and 
rational expectations renders counterfactual analysis impossible.  To see this, substitute 
(11) into (13) to yield 
 














Equation (16) says that real GDP depends only on random shocks and on the shape of the 
aggregate-supply function (the parameter α), but not in any way on the policy parameters 
γ1 and γ2.  This is the formal derivation of the policy-ineffectiveness proposition.   
  One might be inclined to dismiss policy-ineffectiveness as a very special and very 
likely non-robust result.  In particular, economists typically place less confidence in 
dynamic theory than in equilibrium theory.  But, as it turns out, policy ineffectiveness is a 
generic property of models with a surprise-only supply structure and rational 
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expectations.  Although there are alternatives, it characterizes a broad and attractive class 
of models. 
  The new classical approach can be seen as placing extreme faith in economic 
theory and, nevertheless, completely undermining the counterfactual analysis that causal 
analysis in the Cowles Commission framework was meant to support. Toward the end of 
the 1970s, macromodels were assaulted from the opposite extreme.  Rejecting the typical 
identifying restrictions used in macromodels as literally “incredible” – not grounded in 
theory or other sure knowledge – Christopher Sims (1980) advocated the abandonment of 
the Cowles Commission program in favor of a nonstructural characterization of 
macroeconomic data, the so-called vector autoregression (VAR).  A VAR might take a 
form such as 
 
(17)      yt t t t t p m y y Ε + Π + Π + Π = − − − 1 3 1 2 1 1 ,  
 
(18)      mt t t t t p m y m Ε + Γ + Γ + Γ = − − − 1 3 1 2 1 1 , 
 
(19)      pt t t t t p m y p Ε + Λ + Λ + Λ = − − − 1 3 1 2 1 1 . 
 
These equations should be understood as reduced forms.  The coefficients are not 
structural and the error terms are not in general independent.  While only a single lagged 
value of each variable is shown, in general these lags should be taken as standing for a set 
of longer (possibly infinite) lagged values. 
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  Having eschewed structure, the Cowles Commission analysis of causal order is 
not available to the VAR modeler.  VAR analysis, however, grew out of an older 
tradition in time-series statistics.  Sims (1972) had introduced Granger’s (1969) approach 
to causality into macroeconometric analysis.  Granger’s notion is temporal (causes must 
precede effects) and informational (A causes B if A carries incremental information useful 
in predicting B).  In (17), for instance, m does not Granger-cause y if the estimate of Π2 is 
statistically insignificant. 
  Granger-causality does not suffer from the inferential problem:  systems like (17)-
(19) are easily estimated and the statistical tests are straightforward.  But it is no help 
with the counterfactual problem, despite the ease with which many practicing economists 
have jumped from a finding of Granger-causality to an assumption of controllability.  Just 
recalling that the reduced-form parameters of the VAR must be complicated functions of 
the underlying structure should convince us of the unsuitability of Granger-causal 
ordering to counterfactual analysis.   
  More specifically, Granger-causality is easily shown not to be necessary for 
counterfactual control.  Imagine that structurally m causes y, and that m is chosen in such 
a way to offset any systematic (and, therefore, predictable) fluctuations in y, then m will 
not be conditionally correlated with y (i.e., Π2 = 0).  For example, suppose that the wheel 
of ship causes it to turn port or starboard, but that the helmsman tries to hold a perfectly 
steady course.  The ship is buffeted by the waves and swells.  Yet, if the helmsman is 
successful, the ship travels in straight line, while the wheel moves from side to side in an 
inverted counterpoint to the movements of the sea.  There should be no observable 
correlation between the direction of the ship and that of the wheel along a single heading. 
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  Granger-causality may not be sufficient in practice for counterfactual control.  
Suppose that ceteris paribus the higher the stock of money or the  lower the demand for 
money, the higher the price level.  Further suppose that the demand for money will be 
lower when people anticipate inflation (i.e., prices higher in future than today).  If people 
know that the money stock will rise in future, then prices will rise in future, so that 
inflation is higher and the demand for money is lower today.  In that case, prices will rise 
somewhat today as a fixed supply of money would otherwise exceed the lower demand.  
Now if people are better able to predict the future course of money than are 
econometricians, then the econometricians will find that prices today help to predict the 
future stock of money.  In this case, prices Granger-cause money, even though money 
structurally causes prices ex hypothesi (Hoover 1993, 2001, ch. 2). 
  One might counter this argument by saying that it simply shows that the 
econometrician has relied on incomplete information.  It raises an important ontological 
issue for macroeconomics.  Given the way that macroeconomic aggregates are formed, it 
is likely that there is always more information reflected in the behavior of people than is 
reflected in even an ideal aggregate.  If that is so, then conflicts between structural and 
Granger-causality are inevitable. 
  A similar point applies to the assumption of time order implicit in Granger-
causality:  causes strictly precede effects.  Practically, this is clearly not true.  
Contemporaneous Granger-causality easily shows up with data sampled at coarse 
intervals:  months, quarters, years.  But would it go away if we could take finer and finer 
cuts of the data?  The existence of an aggregate such as real GDP as a stable, causally 
significant variable is threatened by taking too fine a cut.  Real GDP measures the flow of 
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goods and services – the amount of final products produced over a unit of time.  While 
one could in principle add up such a quantity over intervals of an hour or a second, such 
an aggregate would fluctuate wildly with the time of day (think what happens to GDP at 
night or meal times) in a way that has no causal significance in macroeconomics.  At any 
interval over which it is causally significant, the relationships may be contemporaneous 
rather than strictly time-ordered. 
  As already observed, the most developed theory is about static equilibrium or 
steady states.  The relationships in such steady states are essentially timeless, yet this 
does not rule out a structural causal order (notice that there are no time subscripts in (3’’) 
and (4’’) above). 
  Economists have found it hard to get by with just Granger-causality and VARs.  
This is because they are not ready to abandon counterfactual analysis.  The VAR program 
started at the nonstructural extreme.  It has gradually added just enough structure to 
permit a minimal counterfactual analysis.  A key feature of the VAR is that all variables 
are modeled as endogenous.  Ultimately, it is only the errors (or “shocks”) that cause 
movements in the variables.  But the shocks in (17)-(19) are intercorrelated.  What does it 
mean to evaluate, say,  a money shock when any randomly selected value of Emt changes 
the probability distribution of Eyt  and Ept as well?  In the wake of criticism from Cooley 
and LeRoy (1985), Leamer (1985) and others, Sims (1982, 1986) and other VAR analysts 
quickly admitted that contemporaneous structure was needed. 
  The preferred structures involved a linear transformations of the VAR that 
eliminated the correlation between the error terms.  A typical structural VAR (or SVAR) 
takes the form: 
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(20)     yt t t t t p m y y Ε + Π + Π + Π = − − − 1 3 1 2 1 1 ,  
 
(21)     mt t t t t y t p m y y m Ε′ + Γ′ + Γ′ + Γ′ + Γ′ = − − − 1 3 1 2 1 1 , 
 
(22)     pt t t t t y t m t p m y y m p Ε′ + Λ′ + Λ′ + Λ′ + Λ′ + Λ′ = − − − 1 3 1 2 1 1 . 
 
This system is recursively ordered with yt causing mt, and yt and mt causing pt.  (The 
transformation of the VAR into an SVAR in which each variable is a direct cause of 
every variable below it in the recursive order is called triangular and is achieved through 
a Choleski decomposition.)  At all other lags the system remains causally unstructured.  
But this minimal structure is enough to eliminate the correlations among the error terms.  
So now, a unique shock to the money equation or the price equation makes sense.  The 
typical way of evaluating SVARs is to calculate the effects of a shock to a single 
equation, setting all other shocks to zero.  These are called impulse-response functions 
and are usually displayed as a separate graph of the path of each variable in response to 
each shock.  
  Unfortunately, the Choleski transformation that generated the triangular ordering 
of the contemporaneous variables is not unique.  There are six possible Choleski 
orderings.  These are observationally equivalent in the sense that they are all 
transformations of the same reduced form.  And with n variables, as long as at least  
n(n – 1)/2 restrictions are imposed to secure identification, there can be non-Choleski 
(i.e., not strictly recursive) orderings as well. 
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  Not only does formal economic theory not often express a preference for a 
particular contemporaneous ordering, the founding sentiment of the VAR program was 
that theory was not to be trusted to provide structure.  In practice macroeconomists have 
offered casual, often temporal, arguments to support particular orderings.  For example, 
commodity prices are observed daily but the Federal Reserve’s policy action must act 
slowly, so the commodity-price index must be ordered ahead of the Federal Reserve’s 
targeted interest rate.  These are mostly “Just So” stories and easily fall foul of some of 
the problems with temporal arguments that applied in the case of Granger-causality. 
  Structural VARs have become the dominant tool of empirical macroeconomics, 
often adopted by researchers who subscribe to the fundamental tenets of the new classical 
macroeconomics, even while distrusting the details of any theoretical model that could 
generate identifying restrictions.  But the SVAR stands in an uneasy relationship with the 
new classical analysis.
6  If the Lucas critique is correct, then are not the coefficients of 
the SVAR likely to shift with changes in economic policy, rendering the impulse-
response functions inaccurate?   
  One response has been to admit the Lucas critique on principle but to argue that 
true changes in policy are rare (Sims 1986).  Most monetary-policy actions are seen as 
realizations of particular processes.  Impulse-response functions may prove to be accurate 
on this view; yet, once again, how is one to conduct counterfactual analysis?  LeRoy 
(1995) has argued – unpersuasively in my view – that a policymaker can be seen as 
delivering a set of nonrandom shocks without violating rational expectations.  Leeper and 
Zha (2003) do not go quite so far.  They argue that there is a threshold of perceptibility 
                                                 
6 On the tension within the new classical macroeconomics between the SVAR and structural approaches, 
see Hoover (2005). 
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for violations of randomness.  Below that threshold (defined by the duration of the string 
and the size of the shocks), a policymaker can deliver a string of nonrandom shocks that 
do not trigger the Lucas critique and, yet, are economically significant.   
  The example of the new classical model in (9)-(13) demonstrates a generalizable 
point that in those cases in which the Lucas critique is relevant, policy is innocuous.  
Counterfactual analysis needs some structure, the SVAR does not provide enough.  I 
return to this point in Section V below. 
 
IV.  Inferring Causes From Interventions 
The Cowles Commission approach put theory to the forefront in order to support 
counterfactual policy analysis.  The skeptical SVAR program tried to do with as little 
theory as possible.  The SVAR program sees the Lucas critique as a threat, since true 
changes in policy regime would vitiate the VAR estimates.  My own approach in earlier 
work (summarized in Hoover 2001, chs. 8-10) is, in sense, to embrace the Lucas critique 
as a source of information about the underlying causal structure.  The idea is an essential 
one for the structural or manipulability account:  the causal relationship is defined as one 
that possesses a certain type of invariance.  The previous equations used to illustrate 
Simon’s account of causal order can be used to show this point.   
  Suppose that the system (7) and (8), in which m causes y, reflect the true – but 
unknown – causal order.  A policy intervention might be a change in the parameter δ.  
The parameter may not be identified, and, so, the change will not be directly observed.  
Yet, we may know from, for example, institutional (or other nonstatistical) information 
that a policy change has occurred.  Such a change would, however, not alter the 
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parameters of (8).  Now suppose that the system (7’) and (8’), which could be interpreted 
(incorrectly, of course) as reflecting y causing m, is considered as an alternative.  Again, 
if we know that a policy change has occurred, we see that both the coefficients of the m 
equation (7’) and the y equation (8’) have shifted.  The stability of (7) and (8) against the 
instability of (7’) and (8’) argues in favor of the causal direction running from m to y.  
There is no free lunch here.  Where identification in structural models is achieved 
through a priori theoretical knowledge, identification of causal direction is achieved here 
through knowledge of independent interventions. 
  This invariance approach is closely related to the econometric notion of 
superexogeneity (Engle, Hendry, and Richard 1983; Hendry 1995).  Superexogeneity is 
defined with reference to the stability of the statistical distribution in the face of 
interventions.  My own approach emphasizes the importance of referring to the causal 
structure itself and is, in that sense, more fundamentally indebted to the Cowles 
Commission analysis of structure.  The importance of this distinction can be seen in the 
new classical model whose solution is given in (11) and (13).  On a superexogeneity 
standard, the instability of the coefficients of (13) in the face of a change in policy that 
(observable or not) changes γ1 or γ2, might be taken to count against mt 
contemporaneously causing yt.  Yet, on the Cowles Commission standard, the causal 
order clearly runs from mt to yt.  The important point is that the effects of interventions do 
not run against the arrow of causation.  This is still true in this case, an intervention in the 
aggregate-supply process (a change in α) does not result in any shift of the coefficients of 
(11).  
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  Favero and Hendry (1992) and Ericsson and Hendry (1999) have used 
superexogeneity tests to check whether the Lucas critique matters in practice (see also 
Ericsson and Irons 1995).  This is exactly right.  And if it does not – probably because 
expectations are not formed according to the rational-expectations hypothesis – then the 
inference of causal direction from invariance is easier.  But if the Lucas critique in fact 
matters, then more subtlety is needed to tease causal direction out of information about 
invariance.   
  The key point is that it is not invariance but structure that defines causality; 
invariance only provides information that is often helpful in causal inference.  There is 
always invariance at some level, but not always at the level of ordinary correlations or 
regression relationships.   
 
V. Graph-theoretic Accounts of Causal Structure  
Causal inference using invariance testing is easily overwhelmed by too much happening 
at once.  It works best when one or, at most, a few causal arrows are in question, and it 
requires (in economic applications, at least) the good fortune to have a few – but not too 
many – interventions in the right parts of the structure.  Over the past twenty years, a new 
analysis of causal structure based in graph theory has provided important theoretical and 
practical advances in causal analysis (Spirtes, Glymour, Scheines 2000; Pearl 2000).  
These advances have, however, barely touched economics, yet they may help to 
overcome some of the limitations of the invariance approach.   
  In the Cowles Commission account an adequate econometric model has two 
distinct but related parts:  the probability distribution of the variables and their causal 
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structure.  Spirtes et al. (2000) and Pearl (2000) subscribe completely to this view of 
structure, but offer a more perspicacious way of keeping track of causal relations.  Graphs 
have been used for more than a century to indicate causal structure, but only recently 
have the mathematical tools of graph theory given researchers a highly efficient way to 
express causal connections and to analyze and manipulate them in relations to the 
associated probability distributions. 
  The key idea of the graph-theoretic approach is related to Reichenbachs (1956) 
principle of the common cause.  If A and B are probabilistically dependent, then either A 
causes B or B causes A or both have a common cause.  The common cause might be a 
parent as in Figure 1 or a set of ancestors as in Figure 2.  The causal Markov condition is 
closely related to Reichenbach’s principle.  Roughly, it says that if C is a set of ancestors 
to A and B and if  A and B are not directly causally connected and are not probabilistically 
independent, then A and B are independent conditional on C.   
  In practice, independence is usually judged by estimating (conditional) 
correlations among variables.  This raises three issues.  First, independence implies an 
absence of correlation, but an absence of correlation does not imply independence.  (For 
an example, see Lindgren (1976, p. 136).)   
  Second, the independence relationships of interest are those of the population, and 
not the sample.  Inference about sample correlations is statistical and thus reliable only 
subject to the usual caveats of statistical inference.   
  But, third, even measured correlations are meaningful only in the context of a 
maintained model of the probability distribution of the variables.  This distinction 
becomes important when statistics that apply to stationary or homogeneous data 
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interpreted as applying equally well to nonstationary or inhomogeneous data.  For 
example, the well-known counterexample to Reichenbach’s principle of the common 
causes due to Elliott Sober (1994, 2001) states that bread prices in England and sea levels 
in Venice, which ex hypothesi, are not causally connected are nonetheless correlated, 
violating Reichenbach’s principle.  Hoover (2003) shows that Sober implicitly assumes a 
stationary probability model when the best model would involve variables that either 
trend or follow a random walk.  Time-series statisticians have known for a long time than 
ordinary measures of correlation fail to indicate probabilistic dependence in such models.  
Keeping these caveats in mind, we shall, for purposes of exposition, assume that 
correlations measure independence.   
  The idea of vanishing conditional correlation is also found in the notion of 
screening, familiar from the literature on probabilistic causation.  If cor(A, B) ≠ 0 and C 
is causally between A and B (A  → C → B or A  ← C ← B), then cor(A, B|C) = 0. 
  Conditioning can also induce correlation.  The classic example if shown in Figure 
3.  Here cor(A, B) = 0, but cor(A, B|C) ≠0.  C is called an unshielded collider on the path 
ACB.  It is a “collider” because two causal arrows point into it, and it is “unshielded” 
because A and B are not directly causally connected.  Figure 4 shows two shielded 
colliders.  In each case cor(A, B) ≠ 0. 
  There is a number of algorithms that start with all the first-order correlations of a 
set of variables and search for patterns of unshielded colliders, common causes, and 
screens consistent with the observed correlations.  The best known software for 
implementing these algorithms is the Tetrad program of Sprites et al. (1996). 
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 The  Observational Equivalence Theorem (Pearl 2000, p. 19, Theorem 1.2.8; 
Sprites et al. 2000, ch. 4) states that any probability distribution that can be faithfully 
represented in a causally sufficient, acyclical (or what econometricians would call a 
recursive) graph can equally well be represented by any other acyclical graph that has the 
same skeleton (i.e., the same causal connections ignoring direction) and the same 
unshielded colliders.  Such graphs form an observationally equivalent class.  Figure 4 
shows two observationally equivalent graphs.  In each case, they have the same causal 
connections but differ in the direction of causation between C and D.  In the first case, a 
program such as Tetrad can direct the arrow.  In the second case, it cannot. 
  How can graph-theoretic ideas be applied to macroeconomics?  One limitation is 
worth noting at the outset.  Search algorithms based on the causal Markov condition can 
easily miss causal linkages in situations of optimal control (for example, the helmsman in 
section III who tries to steer on a constant heading) for exactly the same reason that 
Granger-causality tests failed:  in the ideal case, the values of the control variable are 
chosen to minimize the variability of the controlled variable, and the correlation between 
them vanishes (Hoover 2001, pp. 168-170).  Spirtes et al. (2000, p. 66) and Pearl (2000, 
p. 63) dismiss this as a “Lebesgue measure-zero” result.  While this may do in some 
cases, it will not do in economics, because such cases arise naturally in economics when 
policies are chosen optimally to minimize the variability of a target.  (Stabilizing GDP 
around its trend is much like stabilizing the movements of a ship around the preferred 
heading.)  This, by no means, renders the approach or the algorithms useless, but it does 
serve remind us that it is the causal structure that is primary and not the tools that are 
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used to uncover it.  When tools do not work in some circumstances, other tools are 
needed. 
  Another problem in applying these tools to macroeconomic applications is that, in 
most cases, they have been developed with stationary, non-time-dependent data in mind.  
But macroeconomics works primarily with time-series and often with nonstationary time 
series.  Swanson and Granger (1997) made a first pass at applying these methods to 
VARs.  Their method can be explained with reference to the VAR in (17)-(19).  Although 
the variables the variables themselves are time-dependent and possibly nonstationary, the 
error terms are not.  If the VAR is correctly specified, then the residual errors are serially 
uncorrelated with a zero mean and constant variance.  Instead of looking at the 
correlations among the primary variables, Swanson and Granger look at the correlations 
among their corresponding error terms, reinterpreted as the variables with their time-
series dynamics filtered out.   
  Swanson and Granger limit themselves to causation in a line without considering 
common causes (e.g.,  t Y
~
  →  t M
~
→  t P
~
, where the tildes over the variables indicate that 
they are filtered).  They do not use the common algorithms available in Tetrad.  Instead, 
they check for screening directly.  This allows them to put the variables in order, but not 
to orient the arrows of causation.  Like other VAR analysts, once they have selected an 
order, they rely on an argument of temporal priority to orient the chain of causation.  
Once they have determined the order among the filtered variables, they impose them on 
the original VAR and transform it into an SVAR.  
 
VI. A Synthetic Program for Uncovering the Causal Structure of VARs 
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I have been highlighting the tensions between causal inference and the counterfactual 
uses of causation and the parallel tensions between structural and non-structural 
econometric models.  But despite these tensions, my aim is essentially the irenic one of 
looking for the best in the various approaches.  The best available account of causal order 
in economics is found in the Cowles Commission structural analysis.  But as a strategy of 
causal inference it is infeasible.  It provides no mechanism for effective feedback from 
empirical facts about the world to the theory that is used to structure the empirical 
measurement of causes.  The VAR program has that much right.  The identification 
assumptions of the Cowles Commission program are incredible.  Unfortunately, the VAR 
program also needs structure to proceed.  The questions are:  how little structure can we 
get away with and still have something useful to say?  and how are we to learn about 
structure?  I want to conclude by briefly describing my research program on the causal 
orderings of VARs (joint work with Selva Demiralp and Stephen J. Perez).  Our approach 
emphasizes the complementarity of various approaches to causation in macroeconomics. 
  We start where Swanson and Granger left off.  Their useful idea is that the 
contemporaneous causal order of the SVARs can be determined by applying graph-
theoretic methods to the filtered variables.  Along with a small group of other researchers, 
we have extended their methods to consider recursive or acylical orderings more 
generally and not just simple causal chains (see Demiralp and Hoover 2003 and the 
references therein).  For this we used the PC algorithm in Tetrad.  What makes this a 
nontrivial exercise is that the algorithms in Tetrad are data search procedures in which 
the search path involves multiple sequential testing.  Economists are famously wedded to 
a Neyman-Pearson statistical testing philosophy in which such “data mining” is viewed 
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with the greatest skepticism.  Previously, Hoover and Perez (1999 and 2004) have 
investigated LSE search methodologies in Monte Carlo studies and have demonstrated 
that properly disciplined search algorithms can, despite economists fears, have extremely 
well-behaved statistical properties.  Demiralp and Hoover (2003) demonstrate in a Monte 
Carlo study that the PC algorithm is very effective when applied to the SVAR at 
recovering the skeleton of underlying causal graphs and, provided that signal strengths 
are high enough, at oriented the edges as well.   
  The problem of whether or not (or to what degree) an algorithm identifies a causal 
order is not as straightforward as determining the distribution of a statistical test – the 
typical application of Monte Carlo studies.  In particular, the effectiveness is likely to be 
highly dependent on the true underlying causal structure – something that cannot be 
known in advance in actual empirical applications.  Demiralp, Hoover, and Perez (2005) 
have therefore developed a bootstrap method in which simulations can be adapted to 
actual data without knowing the true underlying structure.  The bootstrap method starts 
by estimating a VAR, in the same way as one normally obtains the filtered variables, but 
then treats the error terms as a pool of random variates from which to construct a large 
number of simulated data sets.  A causal search algorithm is then applied to each 
simulated data set and the chosen causal order is recorded.  Statistics summarizing the 
frequency of occurrence of different causal structures are then used in the manner of 
Monte Carlo simulations in the earlier study to construct measures of the reliability of the 
causal identification for the specific case under study.   
  Graph-theoretic methods are attractive in the VAR context partly because they are 
well suited to handle relative large numbers of variables.  Nevertheless, as we have 
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already seen, there may remain some observational equivalence, so that some causal links 
cannot be oriented.  Macroeconomics quite commonly involves policy regime changes 
and structural breaks that can be exploited as in my own earlier approach to causal 
inference. 
  The impulse-response functions of VARs are known to be inaccurately estimated.  
In part, this arises because they include large numbers of lagged and often highly 
correlated regressors.  Conditional on the contemporaneous causal order being held fixed, 
it should be possible to conduct systematic exclusion restrictions of variables and their 
lags from the different equations of the structure.  These are effectively Granger-causality 
tests.  The elimination of variables which are not Granger-causal should help to sharpen 
the estimates. 
  This program of discovering the structure of the VAR from data helps to preserve 
the insight that a priori theory alone cannot get us too far.  But let me end on a cautionary 
note.  The discovery of the contemporaneous causal VAR through graph-theoretic 
methods supplemented by invariance-based methods and refined by Granger-causality 
tests may still not deliver enough structure to support counterfactual analysis.   
To illustrate the problem, the structure in (11) and (13) is compatible with an 
SVAR in which contemporaneous money causes contemporaneous real GDP.  And, as 
we have seen, it delivers policy ineffectiveness.  It is a simple model, but policy 
ineffectiveness generalizes to complex models.   
  Since the 1970s, however, many – if not most – macroeconomists have come to 
believe that, in the short run, systematic monetary policy does have real effects.  This 
might be because expectations are not formed rationally (or because economic actors 
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follow rules of thumb that make no reference to expectations at all) or because slowly 
adjusting wages and prices undermine the surprise-only aggregate supply relationship.  
To make the point in a simple way, we can imagine that for either of these reasons (11) is 
replaced by  
 
(23)      yt = βmt + εyt, 
 
which shows that money directly affects real GDP.   
  Notice that (11) and (23) form a system which is, again, consistent with an SVAR 
in which money is contemporaneously causally ordered ahead of real GDP.  But the 
system (11) and (23) does not display policy ineffectiveness.  Indeed, systematic 
monetary policy can be quite powerful in this system.  Both the system (11) and (13) and 
the system (11) and (23) are compatible with the same SVAR.  But the counterfactual 
experiment of what happens to real GDP when systematic monetary policy is changed 
(that is, what happens when γ1 or γ2) is changed are radically different:  in the first case, 
nothing; in the second case, a great deal (Cochrane 1998). 
  In a sense, we have come full circle.  The initial problem was that we needed to 
assume that we already knew the causal structure in order to make measurements of 
causal strengths and to conduct counterfactual analysis.  We argued that a variety of 
methods of causal inference may allow us to discover large parts of causal structure.  And 
now we see that even if we are very successful, it still may not be enough for 
counterfactual analysis.  None of our methods definitively resolves the initial tension. 
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  It is, perhaps, not ultimately resolvable.  Yet, I do not view the process as 
hopeless.  Rather it is one of iterating between whichever pole is most immediately 
obstructing our progress.  For example, in a more complicated version of the problem just 
set out Òscar Jordá and I (Hoover and Jordá 2001) assume that the economy consists 
partly of agents who follow an analogue to (11) and (13) and partly agents who follow an 
analogue of (11) and (23).  On the assumption that the shares of each type of agent is 
stable, we use changes in monetary policy regimes to recover the shares and to identify 
the underlying structure.  This approach parallels closely the invariance-based methods of 
causal inference.  But notice that it still relies on strong assumptions not only of the 
constancy of the shares, but also of the particular forms of the two aggregate-supply 
functions.  We try to make these as generic and general as possible, but they cannot be 
perfectly general.  So, we are again brought round to the conclusion that counterfactual 
analysis requires strong untestable, a priori assumptions, and to the open question:  how 
do we know that they are true?  
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